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Abstract
As producers move toward intensive dryland cropping systems, the potential for
inequities in cropshare lease arrangements exists. A whole farm budget was developed  to
evaluate returns for landowner and tenant from different cropshare lease arrangements.
Results suggest that cropshare lease adjustments are necessary as cropping systems
become more intensive.1
 Equitable Cropshare Arrangements for Intensive Dryland Cropping Systems   
Recent changes in agriculture policy and concerns about crop prices have
increased incentives to change from traditional wheat fallow rotations to more intensive
cropping systems. Although cropping systems are changing, cropshare lease arrangements
have been slow to follow (Nitchie, 1996). With the changes in production practices and
cropping systems, an imbalance of costs, returns, and risk has become apparent. This
imbalance has created a need for a process to determine the fair and equitable cropshare
lease rates for more intensive dryland crop systems.  Adjustments to traditional cropshare
lease arrangements may be necessary to maintain an equitable agreement between
landowners and cropshare tenants.
Presently 47 percent of the agricultural land in Nebraska is leased each year, and
cropshare leasing is the primary leasing arrangement throughout most of the state for the
crop acres (Johnson, et al., 1998). In addition, dryland crop acreage in the northwest
region of Nebraska is nearly exclusively leased on a cropshare basis. The standard
cropshare percentage arrangement in the area is a 2/3 - 1/3 tenant-landowner share
comprising over 75 percent of the lease arrangements in 1996(Johnson, et al., 1998).
Some change toward other arrangements is occurring, although adjustments are slow. As
recently as 1986, over 90 percent of the cropshare arrangements were a 2/3 - 1/3  tenant-
landowner share agreement (Johnson and Lundeen, 1987). Much of the movement has
been toward a 3/4 - 1/4  tenant-landowner share with an increase from 2 percent of the
arrangements in 1986 (Johnson and Lundeen, 1987) to 10 percent in 1996 (Johnson, et al.,2
1998). The increase in 3/4 - 1/4 tenant-landowner share arrangements reflects the number
of dryland crop acres that are being converted to more intensive crop rotations.
Historically, the return on investment for land, machinery, and operating costs, as
well as return to management, have been residual claimants on the farming operation.
Although these are residual claimants, for budgeting purposes frequently the returns have
been designated using some predetermined capitalization rate. However, in practice the
tenant and landowner pay all cash obligations, then evaluate the remaining cash to
determine the actual return on investment. The objective of this study is to determine the
return on investment for both tenant and landlord in a dryland cropshare agreement.  The
return on investment will be determined for the traditional wheat-fallow rotation with a
2/3 - 1/3 share and for more intensive crop rotations with alternative share agreements.
Inequities that may occur under different production systems and share agreements will be
presented.
Procedure
Return to the landowner is a limiting factor in considering the proper cropshare
percentage and the ability of the tenant to meet the income expectations of the landowner.
A whole farm budget was developed to evaluate return to investment and management for
both the landowner and tenant using a spreadsheet that allows for different crop rotations
and adjustments to the cropshare lease percentages (Figure 1). The landowner’s
investment in crop production includes land and any operating costs that are shared with
the tenant. The investment for the tenant includes machinery and operating costs required3
Figure 1. Example of abbreviated whole farm budget spreadsheet used to compute
returns on investment and management for landowner and tenant farmer.
Investment Value
Land Machinery Projected
Crops Included Acres $/Acre $/Acre Yield Price
Wheat 600.00  385.00  235.34  35  $3.15 
Proso Millet 600.00  385.00  164.74  20  $5.34 
Fallow 600.00  385.00 
Whole Farm Costs
Wheat Millet Wheat Millet Total Landowner Tenant
Description $/Acre $/Acre Cost Cost Cost 25.00% 75.00%
Total Variable Costs 40.52  49.46  24,312.00  29,676.00  53,988.00  2,190.00  51,798.00 
Total Fixed Costs 30.71  24.99  18,424.50  14,992.50  33,417.00  12,285.00  21,132.00 
Total of All Costs 71.23  74.45  42,736.50  44,668.50  87,405.00  14,475.00  72,930.00 
Projected Gross Returns 110.25  106.80  66,150.00  64,080.00  130,230.00  32,557.50  97,672.50 
Government Payments 9.47  9.47  5,682.00  5,682.00  11,364.00  2,841.00  8,523.00 
Projected Net Returns 48.49  41.82  29,095.50  25,093.50  54,189.00  20,923.50  33,265.50 
Return to Total Investment and Management Costs 5.49%
   Return to Land and Management Costs (Landowner) 3.01%
   Return to Operating, Machinery, and Management Costs (Tenant) 11.40%
for growing the crops. The 1999 Nebraska Crop Budgets are the basis for development of 
the whole farm model. Separate budgets were used for each of the crops in the possible
intensive rotation schedules (proso millet, sunflowers, corn) and for the traditional wheat-
fallow rotation. These budgets were then combined in the proper proportion to develop
the whole farm budget based on 1,800 acres of tillable land with 900 acres in wheat and
900 acres fallow in the traditional wheat-fallow rotation. The three more intensive
cropping systems evaluated were all two crops in three years rotations with wheat in 1/3
of the crop land; corn, sunflowers, or dryland corn in 1/3 of the crop land; and 1/3 of the4
crop land to remain in fallow. Acres in crop and fallow are adjusted for each rotation
system as necessary to match rotational requirements. Baseline calculations were
developed using five-year average yields and prices for the Nebraska Panhandle. The five-
year average prices are: wheat, $3.15 per bushel; proso millet, $5.34 per cwt; sunflowers,
$11.14 per cwt; and corn, $2.70 per bushel. The corresponding five-year average yields
are: wheat, 35 bushels per acre; proso millet, 20 cwt per acre; sunflowers, 10 cwt per acre;
and corn, 45 bushels per acre. The 1998 average dryland crop value as published
(Johnson, 1998) is $385.00 per acre for the Nebraska Panhandle. Present land prices are
used for this study to accurately estimate return on investment in relation to other
presently available market investment opportunities for the landowner. Upon completion
of the baseline annual return from a wheat-fallow system on 2/3 - 1/3 cropshare
arrangement, the whole farm model was used to estimate the projected annual return for
the more intensive systems under a 2/3 - 1/3, a 3/4 - 1/4, and a 4/5 - 1/5 cropshare
arrangement. From these calculations, an equitable cropshare arrangement was selected
for each of the intensive cropping systems. Once the baseline budgets and the
corresponding cropshare recommendations for the intensive systems were developed,
sensitivity tables for changes in prices, yield levels, and land values were developed to
provide explanations concerning the effects of changes in these variables.
Results
The baseline wheat-fallow rotation with the 2/3 - 1/3  tenant-landowner cropshare
arrangement is the most common in the Nebraska Panhandle (Johnson, et al., 1998). With5
the widespread acceptance of the 2/3 - 1/3 cropshare arrangement for dryland wheat
production in the area the 3.06 percent (Table 1) annual return to investment and
management is a rate that landowners have been willing to accept. Under this same
scenario, the return on investment and management for the tenant is 8.46 percent 
(Table 1). Table 1 shows that the annual returns for both the tenant and landowner for
each of the cropshare arrangements. Using these return levels, the traditional wheat-fallow
system under a 2/3 - 1/3 cropshare is equitable with the intensive crop systems at a 3/4 -
1/4 cropshare arrangement. The wheat-proso millet-fallow rotation shows projected
annual returns to the landowner of 3.01 percent, and returns to the tenant of 11.40 percent
(Table 1). The next most profitable rotation for the tenant is the wheat-sunflowers-fallow
rotation with an annual return of 9.74 percent for the tenant and 3.11 percent for the
landowner. The least profitable of all the rotations for both the landowner and tenant is the
wheat-dryland corn-fallow system with returns of 2.91 percent and 6.51 percent,
respectively. The tenant farmer will realize higher return to investment for the intensive
crop systems (as much as three percent return on investment), however, the tenant must
accept an increased risk and management requirement in changing from one crop in two
years to two crops in three years. This return premium is the payment that the tenant may
reasonably expect for accepting the additional risk and management required by the new
cropping system.
These return levels will vary from year to year as changes in crop prices, crop
yields, and land values occur in the marketplace. Each of these factors have a profound6
effect on the return levels to both the landowner and tenant from each of the cropping
systems. The differences in each of these values were evaluated using the recommended
2/3 - 1/3 cropshare arrangement for wheat-fallow and a 3/4 - 1/4 arrangement for each of
the three intensive systems.
Table 1.Percent return to investment in land, machinery, operating cost, and
management for selected crop rotations and cropshare lease arrangement
options using average prices and yields with current (1998) land price.
Cropshare Percent Options
2/3 - 1/3 3/4 - 1/4 4/5 - 1/5







Wheat-Fallow 8.46%3.06% 11.85% 1.86% 13.87% 1.13%
Wheat-Proso Millet-Fallow 7.63%4.60% 11.40% 3.01% 13.65% 2.06%
Wheat-Sunflower-Fallow 6.47%4.73%9.74%3.11% 11.70% 2.14%
Wheat-Dryland Corn-Fallow 3.15%4.45%6.51%2.91%8.51%1.98%
Dryland crop land values for Northwest Nebraska have moved from a high of
$419.00 per acre in 1981 to a low of $242.00 per acre in 1987. Present (1998) land value
is $385.00 per acre in the region, nearly 92 percent of the highest value. Although land
prices have increased steadily over the past ten years, it is possible that land values may
continue to increase or drop to lower values based on the value of production (crop prices
and yields) over the next several years. Another concern with determining the return to
land is consistency in how land is valued on the landowner’s balance sheet. If land is7
valued at the purchase price, the value used to determine the return on investment may
vary significantly from farm to farm based on the purchase date. If a true return on
investment is to be calculated, there is some basis for using present land values because
the money could be diverted to other investments at this time and the present value should
be equal to the expected sale price.
As land prices move to lower levels, the return on investment for the landowner
will increase with no change in returns for the tenant. The return to investment for
$242.00 per acre land increases 1.75 percent over the return at present land prices (Table
2).  At the lower land price, returns to the landowner range from 4.61 percent for the
wheat-dryland corn-fallow rotation to 4.94 percent for the wheat-sunflower-fallow
rotation. This return level is possible if land were purchased at historically low price levels,
and is presently valued based on the purchase price.
The twenty-year high price for this land is $419.00 per acre, only a small increase
over the present value of $385.00 per acre. With present prices at near record high price
levels, there is little response seen by increasing land values to the historic high price level.
Returns to landowner investment drop approximately 0.25 percent at the $419.00 per acre
price level with the highest return at 2.86 percent for the wheat-sunflower-fallow rotation,
and the lowest return at 2.67 percent for the wheat-dryland corn-fallow rotation. In each
case, the return on investment for the tenant remains constant.8
Table 2.Sensitivity table of percent return to investment in land, machinery,
operating cost, and management for selected crop rotations and cropshare

















(2/3 - 1/3 share)
8.46%4.86%8.46%3.06%8.46%2.82%
Wheat-Proso Millet-Fallow
(3/4 - 1/4 share)
11.40% 4.78% 11.40% 3.01% 11.40% 2.77%
Wheat-Sunflower-Fallow
(3/4 - 1/4 share)
9.74%4.94%9.74%3.11%9.74%2.86%
Wheat-Dryland Corn-Fallow
(3/4 - 1/4 share)
6.51%4.61%6.51%2.91%6.51%2.67%
Crop prices and yields will have significant effects on returns to both the
landowner and the tenant. The returns to landowner tend to be more stable over
significant changes in both prices and yields, while the returns to the tenant are much more
volatile (Tables 3, 4, 5, & 6). This volatility from the tenant’s perspective can be directly
attributed a higher share of the production being sold by the tenant farmer. The lowest
price and yield values for each rotation show that the return on investment for the tenant
are as low as a negative 12 percent (Table 6). The lowest return on investment for the
landowner is zero for the lowest price and lowest yield in a wheat-dryland corn-fallow9
rotation (Table 6). The highest returns are in excess of 40 percent for the tenant, while the
highest returns for the landowner are limited to just over 9 percent (Tables 3, 4, 5, & 6). 
Table 3.Sensitivity table of percent return to investment in land, machinery,
operating cost, and management for wheat-fallow rotation under a 1/3
landowner - 2/3 tenant cropshare lease arrangement.
Wheat yield (bu/acre)











$2.00 -8.46% 0.03%-3.73% 0.90%0.98%1.76%5.67%2.62%
$3.00 -3.56% 0.90%3.61%2.19% 10.74% 3.48% 17.86% 4.78%
$4.00 1.35% 1.76% 10.95% 3.48% 20.51% 5.21% 30.05% 6.93%
$5.00 6.25% 2.62% 18.29% 4.78% 30.28% 6.93% 42.23% 9.09%
Table 4.Sensitivity table of percent return to investment in land, machinery,
operating cost, and management for wheat-proso millet-fallow rotation
under a 1/4 landowner - 3/4 tenant cropshare lease arrangement.
Wheat and millet yields (35 bu/ac. wheat; 20 cwt/ac. millet averages)
















4.00 -7.9%0.3% -3.4%0.9% 1.1% 1.6% 5.5% 2.2% 9.9% 2.9%
5.00 -6.0%0.5% -0.9%1.3% 4.1% 2.0% 9.2% 2.7% 14.2%3.5%
6.00 -4.2%0.8% 1.6% 1.6% 7.2% 2.4% 12.9%3.3% 18.5%4.1%
3.50
4.00 -3.0%1.0% 3.1% 1.8% 9.2% 2.7% 15.2%3.6% 21.2%4.4%
5.00 -1.1%1.2% 5.6% 2.2% 12.2%3.1% 18.9%4.1% 25.5%5.1%
6.00 0.7% 1.5% 8.0% 2.5% 15.3%3.6% 22.6%4.6% 29.8%5.7%
5.00
4.00 1.9% 1.6% 9.6% 2.7% 17.3%3.8% 24.9%4.9% 32.5%6.0%
5.00 3.7% 1.9% 12.1%3.1% 20.3%4.3% 28.6%5.5% 36.8%6.6%
6.00 5.6% 2.2% 14.5%3.4% 23.4%4.7% 32.3%6.0% 41.1%7.2%10
Table 5.Sensitivity table of percent return to investment in land, machinery,
operating cost, and management for wheat-sunflower-fallow rotation under
a 1/4 landowner - 3/4 tenant cropshare lease arrangement.
Wheat and sunflower yields  (35 bu/ac. wheat; 10 cwt/ac. sunflower averages)

















9.00 -6.5%0.4% -2.4%1.1% 1.7% 1.8% 5.7% 2.5% 9.8% 3.2%
11.00 -4.6%0.7% -0.3%1.4% 4.3% 2.2% 8.9% 3.0% 13.5%3.8%
13.00 -3.4%0.9% 1.8% 1.8% 6.9% 2.6% 12.0%3.5% 17.1%4.4%
3.50
9.00 -2.4%1.1% 3.1% 2.0% 8.5% 2.9% 14.0%3.8% 19.4%4.8%
11.00 -0.8%1.3% 5.2% 2.3% 11.2%3.3% 17.1%4.4% 23.1%5.4%
13.000.8% 1.6% 7.3% 2.7% 13.8%3.8% 20.3%4.9% 26.7%6.0%
5.00
9.00 1.8% 1.8% 8.6% 2.9% 15.4%4.0% 22.2%5.2% 29.0%6.3%
11.003.3% 2.0% 10.7%3.3% 18.0%4.5% 25.4%5.7% 32.7%6.9%
13.004.9% 2.3% 12.8%3.6% 20.7%4.9% 28.5%6.2% 36.4%7.5%
Table 6.Sensitivity table of percent return to investment in land, machinery,
operating cost, and management for wheat-dryland corn-fallow rotation
under a 1/4 landowner - 3/4 tenant cropshare lease arrangement.
Wheat and dryland corn yields (35 bu/ac. wheat; 45 bu/ac. corn averages)
















2.00-12.2% 0.0% -7.9%0.7% -3.5%1.4% 0.8% 2.1% 5.1% 2.7%
3.00 -8.4%0.6% -2.8%1.5% 2.8% 2.3% 8.3% 3.2% 13.9%4.1%
4.00 -4.6%1.2% 2.2% 2.2% 9.1% 3.3% 15.9%4.4% 22.7%5.5%
3.50
2.00 -7.8%0.7% -2.0%1.6% 3.8% 2.5% 9.6% 3.4% 15.4%4.3%
3.00 -4.0%1.3% 3.1% 2.4% 10.1%3.5% 17.1%4.6% 24.2%5.7%
4.00 -0.2%1.8% 8.1% 3.1% 16.4%4.4% 24.7%5.7% 32.9%7.0%
5.00
2.00 -3.4%1.3% 3.9% 2.5% 11.2%3.6% 18.4%4.8% 25.6%5.9%
3.00 0.4% 1.9% 9.0% 3.3% 17.5%4.6% 25.9%5.9% 34.4%7.3%
4.00 4.2% 2.5% 14.0%4.0% 23.8%5.6% 33.5%7.1% 43.2%8.6%11
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to determine the return on investment and the return
to management under alternative dryland cropping systems and crop share lease
agreements.  Additionally, if the current crop share agreement for the traditional wheat-
fallow rotation is assumed equitable, then this study also sought to determine the equitable
cropshare arrangement for the intensive cropping systems that are becoming more popular
in the region. In addition, sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine the effects of
changes in the land values, crop prices, crop yields on the returns of both landlords and
tenants.
Results from the whole farm model, based on five year average prices and yields,
show that the traditional wheat-fallow system at 2/3 - 1/3 cropshare arrangement is
providing the landowner a three percent return on investment at present land values. This
same level of return  can be maintained under the intensive cropping systems by changing
the cropshare arrangement to a 3/4 - 1/4 split. This arrangement will increase the return on
investment for the tenant farmer to offset the additional management and risk associated
with the intensive cropping system. This adjustment of the cropshare arrangement appears
to offer the landowner an adequate return while allowing the tenant to be compensated for
innovation and risk taking.
The sensitivity analysis shows that the price of land either at purchase or with
subsequent revaluation is an important factor to the return on investment that the
landowner should expect. However, the price of land does not affect the type of cropshare12
lease arrangement recommended. The return on investment remains consistent across the
different cropping systems, only increasing or decreasing by the same percentage as land
values are increased or decreased.
Crop prices and yields will affect the return on investment for both parties in the
lease, however the largest portion of the sensitivity is assigned to the tenant. Because of
this significant variability, the tenant should expect to receive a higher return on
investment and management. The landowner does not reach a point on any of the cropping
systems where return on investment is less than zero. In contrast, the tenant has a number
of situations where the return on investment is negative. The potential for negative returns
or risk is offset by higher potential returns when price and yield values are higher than
average.
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